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KEEPING EPISTEMOLOGY SUPERNATURALIZED: 
A REPLY TO ROSENKRANTZ 
William E. Mann 
I cannot hope to deal adequately with all the thoughtful points raised by Gary 
Rosenkrantz. I would like to give some indication, however, of the direction in 
which I think my responses should go. 
Simplicity and Contingency. Rosenkrantz worries that my reliance on the 
doctrine of divine simplicity forces me to deny that there are any contingent 
facts. Since the major purpose of my paper is to show how it can be that God 
has knowledge of contingent facts, my project turns out to be ironically hollow 
if Rosenkrantz is right. Rosenkrantz offers an admirably lucid argument. 
(1) God = God's omniscience. 
(2) God's omniscience = God's knowledge that I am talking now. 
Thus: 
(3) God = God's knowledge that I am talking now. 
(4) God's omniscience is an essential property of his. 
(5) God has necessary existence. 
But if God is (necessarily) simple, essentially omniscient, and necessarily exis-
tent, then it follows that if I am talking now, then in every possible world I am 
talking now. 
Now I accept very close relatives of (4) and (5), namely 
(4') God is essentially omniscient 
and 
(5') God necessarily exists. 
So if I am to evade Rosenkrantz' conclusion, I must find fault with (1) or (2). 
I think in fact that (1) is ambiguous. Consider the phrase 'the knowledge of 
God'. It can be interpreted either as 'the power or activity by which God knows 
things' or as 'the content of God's knowing activity'. The former interpretation 
is clearly intended in contexts like 'God's knowledge is non-inferential'. The 
latter interpretation is called for in contexts like 'God's knowledge of mathematics 
is complete'. If we transfer this ambiguity to 'God's omniscience', we get two 
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possible readings of (1): 
(I') God = the power or activity by which God knows all things. 
(1 *) God = the complete content of God's all-extensive knowing activ-
ity. 
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Defenders of divine simplicity will accept (I') and reject (l *). Consistent with 
(1'), (2) becomes 
(2') The power or activity by which God knows all things = the power 
or activity by which God knows that I am talking now. 
Thus (3) becomes 
(3') God = the power or activity by which God knows that I am talking 
now. 
Following Rosenkrantz' lead, we may ask now whether the identity expressed 
by (3') is necessary or contingent. My answer is that it is necessary. That does 
not imply that it is necessary that I am talking now. The power or activity by 
which God knows all things is essential to God and invariant across possible 
worlds. The content of God's knowledge, however, does vary across possible 
worlds. That is to say, some of the things God knows are contingent. I 
Simplicity and Noetic Properties. Here is the gist of a second argument of 
Rosenkrantz' designed to show that simplicity is incompatible with contingency. 
Consider the property of knowing that I am talking now. If God knows that I 
am talking now, then he has this property. Either it is essential to him or 
accidental. If essential (and if God exists necessarily), then my talking now is 
not contingent. If accidental, then the property is not identical with God's being 
omniscient (which we are supposing is essential to him). In the latter case, God 
is not perfectly simple. 
The argument gets off the ground only if there is such a property as knowing 
that I am talking now. I am skeptical about the existence of this and kindred 
properties. I hope to show that my skepticism is driven by something more than 
a desire to avoid Rosenkrantz' argument. 
Consider ordinary ascriptions of knowledge to humans. Or rather consider 
ascriptions of beliefs to humans, since the other components of knowledge-a scrip-
tions-truth, justification, and the mysterious quartum quid-are not relevant 
here. Some belief-ascriptions pick out occurrent beliefs. If Smith sees that the 
window is open, then he consciously believes that it is open. Other belief-ascriptions 
pick out dispositional beliefs. Smith may believe that St. Paul is the capital of 
Minnesota without presently entertaining the fact. Now if Smith believes occur-
rently that the window is open, then he is presently in a cognitive state connected 
to some cognitive process-for example, visual perception-which he is under-
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going. Is the occurrent cognitive state a product or result of the cognitive process 
or is it identical with the cognitive process? If you accept the former alternative, 
then you may be inclined to think that believing that the window is open is a 
property of Smith since it is one of his cognitive states and since there appears 
to be no theoretical bar to identifying states with properties. But if, as the second 
alternative has it, Smith's seeing that the window is open just is his (occurrentIy) 
believing that it is open, then it is implausible to maintain that believing that 
the window is open is a property of Smith. It is a Fregean fantasy to suggest 
that if Smith is throwing a baseball, he is characterized, for one shining moment, 
by the "property" throwing a baseball (soon to be replaced by having thrown a 
baseball?). That way of speaking ignores the distinction between a process or 
activity and a property. 
We are now in a position to see how a simplicist should reply to Rosenkrantz. 
A corollary of the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity maintains that God is 
pure actuality, containing no tincture of potentiality. 2 If he believed something 
dispositionally, then to that extent there would be unactualized potentiality in 
God; he could have believed the item occurrently. The doctrine of God's pure 
actuality thus entails that all his beliefs are occurrent. Moreover, God's being 
simple and purely actual entails that there are no cognitive states in him distinct 
from his cognitive activity. However things may stand with Smith's believing 
that the window is open, God's believing that the window is open is not the 
outcome or product of some cognitive process of his. For if it were, then there 
would be either complexity or potentiality (or both) in God. 
Since God's belief cannot be a product of any activity, it must be identical 
with some activity of his. What activity? In my paper, I suggested that the 
activity is his willing. 
A Cold Shoulder to Tropical Ontologies. Rosenkrantz wonders how it can be 
that God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent without his being powerful and 
good. And surely the property of being powerful is distinct from the property 
of being good. Yet if God is powerful and good, and if the doctrine of divine 
simplicity is true, then God's goodness and power must be identical. How can 
all this be so? Rosenkrantz claims, with considerable justification, that my answer 
is to assert, not the identity of being powerful and being good, but rather the 
identity of God's being powerful and God's being good. 
When I wrote "Divine Simplicity," I was concerned to defend a view which 
took expressions like 'the power of God' to refer to property instances or, as 
Rosenkrantz calls them, tropes. The doctrine of divine simplicity which results 
is proof against a series of objections to divine simplicity raised by Alvin Plantinga 
in Does God Have a Nature? Rosenkrantz raises several penetrating questions 
concerning an ontology of tropes, questions to which I cannot do justice here. 
I do not believe that the objections force one to give up on tropes, but I shall 
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not presently defend a tropical ontology. Instead, I shall conclude by speculating 
briefly on an alternative account of the reference of terms like 'the power of 
God', an account which I used to think was defenseless against Plantinga. 
Suppose we take 'the power of God' as referring, naturally enough, to omnipo-
tence, and 'the knowledge of God' as referring to omniscience. Then we will 
have on our hands a version of divine simplicity which endorses identities like 
'Omniscience = Omnipotence' and 'God = Omniscience'. The former identity 
is one that even my tropical theory must defend,3 so the alternative theory fares 
no worse on that score. The latter identity seems to fall prey to the following 
Plantingesque objection. "Omniscience is a property. Thus if God = Omnisci-
ence, then God is a property. Now all properties are abstract objects, from 
whence it follows that God is an abstract object. But God is a living, knowledge-
able, powerful, loving person. No person is an abstract object. Therefore God 
is not an abstract object. We have thus arrived at a contradiction, which is 
precipitated by the assumption that God = Omniscience." 
Why pick on the identity? I propose to pick on another premise, namely the 
claim that no person is an abstract object. This premise gains its credence, I 
suspect, by conflating two different features-or alleged features-of abstract 
objects. On the one hand, it is often claimed that abstract objects-sets, propo-
sitions, meanings, and the like-are nonspatiotemporal in character. On the other 
hand, abstract objects are sometimes said to be completely inert and feckless; 
they exert no causal power. One might claim that these two features are connected, 
perhaps by means of the thesis that everything outside space and time is causally 
powerless. But the thesis is not obvious. Consider these two variations of the 
suspect premise: 
(6) No person is nonspatiotemporal. 
(7) No person is completely feckless. 
I can imagine mounting a persuasive argument for (7). To be a person, it might 
be said, is to be an agent, a being who does some things, sets some plans into 
motions, and so forth. The case for (6) is less clear. I see no reason to think 
that there cannot be nonspatiotemporal persons. The doctrine of God's eternality 
maintains that God is such a person, and I know of no convincing argument that 
show that that doctrine is incoherent or inconsistent. Thus I find myself sym-
pathetic to (7) and unmoved by (6). 
Return now to the premise, 'No person is an abstract object'. Interpret it as 
(6) and I will not accept it. Interpret it as (7) and I will accept it. Now, however, 
the argument in which the premise is embedded yields only the conclusion that 
God is not completely feckless. The contradiction has disappeared. 
Of course the argument still has the subconclusion that God is a property. 
Should that disturb us? I think not. If, as I believe, properties are causal powers, 
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then it follows that God is a causal power. Most causal powers reside in their 
subjects. If the doctrine of divine simplicity we have been probing is correct, it 
turns out that one vast causal power-the source, in fact, of all other causal 
powers-is identical with its subject. 
University of Vermont 
NOTES 
1. I have made a similar point in "Simplicity and Immutability in God." pp. 273-274. 
2. Space precludes my saying how pure actuality is supposed to be a corollary of simplicity. For 
further discussion, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's "Absolute Simplicity," in this 
issue, esp. sect. 7(i). 
3. See "Divine Simplicity," pp. 464,468-471. 
